It is beyond dispute that some officials feared that growing awareness of Ukrainian culture would alienate Little Russians from the empire and that the bureaucratic apparatus worked to prevent the emergence of Ukrainian national separatism. It is less often remarked, however, that throughout the middle third of the 19th century, influential segments of the imperial bureaucracy viewed Little Russian ethno-national consciousness not as a threat but as a powerful weapon in the official struggle to combat Polish influence on Russia's western frontier. 6 Focusing on Kiev-the most active center of Ukrainophile agitation and the administrative center of the empire's southwestern borderlands-this article demonstrates that the support offered to local activists by the St. Petersburg ministries and especially the Kiev governor-general's office played a decisive role in the consolidation of a Ukrainian cultural nation. 7 Official engagement in the elaboration of Ukrainophile ideas in Kiev-and the state's attempts to shape and control these ideas-profoundly influenced the empire's nascent national identities and challenged its long-term stability.
During the 19th century, imperial officials were engaged in a fierce struggle against the Polish-Catholic nobility (szlachta), which had ruled right-bank Ukraine (the lands west of the Dnieper) during the early modern period, remained the dominant social group in the region, and rose up twice (1830-31 and 1863) in failed attempts to resurrect the Polish state. Noting that Little Russian patriots sharply defined themselves against Polish-Catholic culture, envisioned the southwestern borderlands as primordially Orthodox, and argued that the local simple folk (narod ), not the szlachta, were the 6 Several works note periodic convergences in the interests of local officials and Ukrainophile activists and cases in which Russian and Ukrainian identities overlapped after the mid-19th century. See Miller, Ukrainian Question; Vulpius, Nationalisierung der Religion; and Rodkiewicz, Russian Nationality Policy. Nevertheless, all these authors focus on the competition between Russian nation builders and Ukrainian national awakeners. 7 Terminology presents a challenge to historians of 19th-century Ukraine, since terms such as "Little Russian" and "Ukrainophile" have come to carry specific ideological connotations. The former is often understood to refer to ethnic Ukrainians who considered themselves assimilated subjects of the Russian Empire; the latter, to more radical thinkers who envisioned an autonomous Ukrainian nation. This piece questions the utility of these distinctions, since it charts out the long history of cooperation between individuals who have been assigned to the "Little Russian" and "Ukrainophile" camps. This article uses the terms "Little Russian" and "Ukrainophile" interchangeably to describe activists who expressed pride in their native culture and aimed to popularize it. I reserve the term "Ukrainians" to refer to a later generation of nationalist activists who openly worked toward the establishment of a Ukrainian state. Since the discussions highlighted in this article were being carried out in the Russian Empire and primarily in the Russian language, I have transliterated personal names from Russian, with the exception of later Ukrainian activists such as Hrushevs´kyi, who explicitly rejected a Russian imperial identity.
rightful owners of the region's resources, influential segments of the imperial bureaucracy regarded Ukrainophile activists as valuable allies in the campaign to claim the borderlands for the empire. Consequently, officials permitted (and even subsidized) activists' efforts to create a national history, promote the Ukrainian language, and establish unmediated contact with the massesthe tasks classically associated with national awakening. Indeed, bureaucrats reached out even to the most radical khlopomany and hromadtsy, whose populist ideologies they hoped would undermine the power of the szlachta. In their effort to enlist Little Russians in the struggle against Polish civilization, officials thus embarked on an innovative effort to channel the mobilizational power of ethno-national ideas in a "healthy" direction that would reinforce rather than undermine the unity of the empire.
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Of course, the experiment unfolding in Kiev faced serious limitations. Bureaucrats constantly monitored Ukrainophile activities to ensure that they did not jeopardize the integrity of the empire, and they used repressive measures such as the Valuev decree to quash manifestations of Little Russian patriotism that they deemed potentially dangerous. Nevertheless, through the 1870s, Little Russian activists remained key players in the official reclamation of the southwestern borderlands from Polish-Catholic civilization. Indeed, it was after the Valuev decree of 1863 that Kiev Ukrainophiles reached the height of their power and influence, launching new public outreach efforts and securing permission to erect a monument to the 17th-century Cossack hetman Bogdan Khmel´nitskii-a venture that I discuss in depth below.
By the 1870s, as the political threat posed by the szlachta of the southwest receded, officials began to express more consistent concern about the radical ideas of Kiev's Ukrainophiles and the influence they enjoyed. As bureaucrats moved to restrain the Kiev experiment-and revoked their earlier support for the Khmel´nitskii project-rifts emerged among the city's activists. The conflict and denunciations that ensued led directly to the promulgation of the Ems Decree in 1876, which marked the end of the Kiev experiment. Little Russians now began to splinter into groups of self-proclaimed Ukrainian and Russian nationalists, both of which built on the ideas that activists had refined under state tutelage. The former, emphasizing their native land's unique culture and history, argued that the Ukrainian nation should be liberated from tsarist rule. The latter denied the very existence of a Ukrainian nation, arguing that Little Russians had always been the most loyal defenders of the Russian nation. Unable to control the social and ideological forces of nationalism that they had unleashed, the very bureaucrats who attempted to use Little Russian patriotism to save the empire had unwittingly created mutually hostile national communities that hastened its demise.
The Origins of the Kiev Experiment
Following the 1830-31 revolt of the szlachta, the imperial state launched an ambitious program to vanquish Polish influence in right-bank Ukraine. The region's newly appointed governor-general closed Polish schools and banks, revoked Magdeburg law, and resurrected Vil´na's closed universitywhere Polish rebels had freely conspired-in Kiev, naming the institution St. Vladimir's, in honor of the Kievan Rus´ ruler who had converted to Eastern Christianity.
9 From its earliest days, the official de-Polonization campaign relied heavily on the Little Russian gentry who hailed from the left bank of the Dnieper, the heart of the former Cossack hetmanate. Devout Orthodox believers who deplored Polish patrimony and proudly traced their heritage to Cossack officers, these nobles flocked to post-revolt Kiev to work in the governor-general's office and at St. Vladimir's. In 1840, M. A. Maksimovich, a Poltava nobleman and the first rector of St. Vladimir's, launched the historical journal Kievlianin, which celebrated the cultural peculiarities of "southern Russia" as well as the role the region had played in defending the Russian Empire from Catholic incursions.
10 A small circle of local history enthusiasts, which included high-ranking church officials and M. V. Iuzefovich, a Poltava native and an employee of the governor-general's office, soon formed around Maksimovich.
11 Declaring their desire to unearth an "authentic" Kiev unsullied by Catholic influence, these men played an active role in official commissions tasked with rechristening streets whose names were derived from Polish, excavating archeological sites of the Kievan Rus´ period, and gathering manuscripts related to the history of Orthodoxy in Kiev.
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In 1843, Governor-General D. G. Bibikov convened the Commission for the Analysis of Historical Documents to coordinate the activities of local history enthusiasts and to claim Kiev-where Polish language and culture retained a prominent presence among the local bureaucracy and high society-as a primordially Orthodox locale. 13 The group-which aimed to collect and publish documents pertaining to local antiquity, folk customs, and church history-devoted special attention to the suffering of the Little Russian people under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, charging that the szlachta, along with Jewish bankers and estate managers, had conspired to tear the simple folk from their Orthodox faith and destroy their language and culture.
14 Group leaders, who hoped to redress historical injustices through their exposés, also insisted on the importance of publishing historical sources in Ukrainian-which, they argued, lent the materials emotional authenticity.
15
Within a few years of its founding, the commission had become an influential interest group and an important social outlet for Kiev of the Commission for the Analysis of Historical Documents, considering that several of the conspirators-the historians P. A. Kulish and N. I. Kostomarov and the peasant bard T. G. Shevchenko-played an active role on the commission. 17 Furthermore, although the commission was a fully legal organization that had stopped short of advocating a federalist arrangement between Little and Great Russia, its members shared the Cyrillo-Methodians' pride in local culture and abhorrence for the suffering of the Little Russian people under "foreign" exploitation. 18 In the end, though, officials, concerned that excessive punishment of the conspirators might jeopardize further Little Russian participation in the de-Polonization campaign, opted to mitigate the punishments meted out to the conspirators. 19 Meanwhile, the activities of the commission continued unmolested.
By the 1850s, the views of commission members had become even more aligned with the radical populism of Cyrillo-Methodian ideology. Several of the group's members embarked on studies of Cossack Hetman Bogdan Khmel´nitskii, who between 1648 and 1657 led regular armies as well as bands of armed peasants in a series of wars that freed the central Dnieper from Polish-Lithuanian rule and saw brutal attacks against the region's Polish and Jewish populations. 20 As the commission's official publication put it, Polish rule of Little Russia had broken the "internal moral bond between the aristocracy and the people," "subjugated the simple folk to the unlimited power of aristocrats, torn them from their faith, and led them to despise their own nationality [narodnost´ ] ." 21 Maksimovich's 1857 study of Khmel´nitskii hailed the hetman as a popular hero whose violent acts not only delivered the Little Russian people from Polish oppression but also reforged the broken links between elites and masses. 22 Likewise, Kulish praised the violence of "Mr. Khmel´nitskii, the bloodletter," as a redemptive force that had liberated the simple folk from the "damned szlachta."
23 The group's continued praise for the glories of the hetmanate-and open admiration for peasant jacqueries-in 1853 prompted St. Petersburg to remind Kiev intellectuals not to let their passion for the "nationality or language of Little Russia" to "outweigh one's love for the fatherland-that is, the empire."
24 Nevertheless, the Kiev governorgeneral's office, which continued to underwrite the group's expeditions and publications, remained steadfast in its support for the commission, further sanctioning its views by creating an archive at St. Vladimir's to house the 500,000 documents that it had by then collected.
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By 1860, Polish patriots had renewed their efforts to incite an uprising against the tsarist order among both educated society and the peasant masses. 26 However, a small circle of young Polish nobles in Kiev, led by the St. Vladimir's student V. B. Antonovich, renounced revanchist patriotism and the estate interests of the szlachta, declaring themselves men of the people. These so-called khlopomany donned traditional folk costumes, learned Ukrainian, and traveled the countryside, denouncing "any form of coercion [nasyl´stvo], the domination of one ethnicity [narodnost´ ] over another, the exploitation [vykorystovuvannia] of one social stratum by another." 27 As they sought to educate and "uplift" the peasantry, these populist activists also hailed the masses as the true carriers of the Ukrainian national spirit, recording their folk songs, costumes, and customs. Leading Ukrainophiles embraced the khlopomany, whose anti-Polish fervor and influence among the peasant masses they saw as a powerful new weapon in the battle against the szlachta. In 1861, prominent commission members (Rigel´man, Galagan, and Iuzefovich), Cyrillo-Methodian alumni (Kostomarov, Kulish), and radical student leaders (Antonovich), joined forces to launch the Russian and Ukrainian-language journal Osnova. Published in St. Petersburg, the journal aspired to raise awareness of Little Russian history, culture, and language across the empire. Antonovich denounced the szlachta's "religious fanaticism, estate egoism, disrespect for human rights [ prava lichnosti ], the enslavement of the peasantry, and arbitrariness in all arenas of social life" in the journal's pages; Kulish called for the need to publish Ukrainian books and compile a Ukrainian-language dictionary.
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Commercially unsuccessful, Osnova ceased publication in 1862, but the Kiev Hromada would carry on its mission. Run by Antonovich and financed by Galagan, the circle continued Osnova's efforts to compile a Ukrainian dictionary, to promote Ukrainian literature, and "to protect the morals, customs, and costumes of the Little Russian nationality."
29 If other Ukrainophile ventures had long insisted that organic, spiritual bonds connected Little Russian elites with the narod, hromadtsy now established unmediated contact with the simple folk, organizing public readings of Shevchenko to peasants, attempting to convert Roman and Greek Catholic believers to Orthodoxy, and operating more than a hundred Sunday schools. "Russo-Little Russian propaganda." 31 Meanwhile, St. Petersburg bureaucrats recognized Osnova as a legal publication, commissioned Kulish to translate the Emancipation Manifesto into Ukrainian, and permitted Kostomarov and Shevchenko to distribute Ukrainian primers and solicit funds to support the publication of Ukrainian-language literature. 32 Some prominent government officials, however, expressed more concern about the emerging alliance between the imperial bureaucracy and Ukrainophile activists. Minister of the Interior P. A. Valuev, who fixated on the Polish origins of some self-proclaimed Little Russian activists, feared that Polish revanchists might use Ukrainophile activities to disguise their efforts to resurrect the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 33 As Ukrainophile activism grew more pervasive in the southwestern borderlands, St. Petersburg convened special investigatory commissions to monitor local developments and to ensure that they did not undermine the foundations of autocratic rule. These groups deemed the actions of a handful of activists potentially dangerous. For example, an 1862 investigation into allegations that P. P. Chubinskii-a khlopoman, member of the Kiev Hromada, and contributor to Osnova-attempted to incite peasants to attack Polish nobles concluded: "although it has not factually been proven that Chubinskii incited peasants in any anti-government movement, allowing similar attempts to continue … could have a dangerous influence on the minds of the simple folk." 34 In his correspondence with a friend, Chubinskii mocked the notion that he could be an "enemy of the government" that, in the emancipation decree of 1861, "liberated 22 million slaves and gave them human rights [chelovecheskie prava]." 35 Hromada activists, Kiev bureaucrats, and Kiev Governor-General I. I. Vasil´chikov himself dismissed the allegations as Polish intrigues designed 31 N. I. Pirogov, "O voskresnykh shkolakh," in his Sochineniia (St. Petersburg, 1887), 2:220. 32 Saunders, "Russia and Ukraine," 34, 38; Danylenko, "Ukrainian Bible," 15. In left-bank Ukraine, which had never been Polish territory and lacked the Polish landed elite of the right bank, authorities were much less tolerant of Ukrainophile activities. On the mass arrests of left-bank Little Russian activists in the early 1860s-which in 1862 prompted the authorities to close Sunday schools empirewide-consult Saunders, "Russia and Ukraine," 42- 43 
As the Chubinskii case demonstrates, imperial officials were determined to ensure that Ukrainophilism would not jeopardize the unity or stability of the empire. Even as they tried to manage the aims and influence of the movement, however, bureaucrats also recognized that the success of the de-Polonization campaign depended heavily on the participation of Little Russian activists. Within the Commission for the Analysis of Historical Documents, Ukrainophile ideas challenged the hegemony of Polish culture; the radically populist ventures undertaken by activists of the early 1860s rallied the power of the unschooled masses behind the imperial state. The coming revolt of 1863, as we shall see, would both challenge and solidify the experiment unfolding in Kiev, simultaneously rendering imperial officials more frightened of the potentially subversive impact of Little Russian activism and more dependent on it.
Ukrainophilism and the 1863 Polish Revolt
By early 1863, large segments of the szlachta in the western borderlands had risen up against the imperial state, attacking arsenals and Russian officials and declaring a provisional government to rule the lands that had been lost to Russia in the Polish partitions. 37 As chaos engulfed the southwest, St. Petersburg officials intensified their scrutiny of the Kiev experiment. In the spring of 1863, the Third Section received an anonymous denunciation that implored the authorities to halt ongoing efforts to translate the Gospels into Ukrainian. Claiming that the broader use of Ukrainian in local intellectual life would eventually challenge Russian as the lingua franca and thus undermine the cultural and political unity of the empire, the author of the letter portrayed 36 
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In June 1863, the publicist M. N. Katkov, who just two years before had expressed his admiration for the unique features of Little Russia's culture and language, raised similar concerns that Ukrainophile activity could undermine imperial unity at the precise moment when the tsarist regime was most vulnerable. "Ukraine has never had its own history, its own government … the Little Russian language never existed, and despite all the efforts of the Ukrainophiles, still does not exist," Katkov wrote.
39 Activists' efforts to highlight the peculiarities of Little Russian culture, he complained, frustrated the empire's efforts to present a united front against Polish civilization, thereby benefiting the "sworn enemies of their own Ukraine." 40 Concerned officials took these allegations quite seriously. Asked to respond to the claims of the anonymous letter, Governor-General P. V. Annenkov found the notion that Ukrainophiles would ally with Polish revanchists absurd, noting that the former worked tirelessly "to counteract Polish-Catholic [latino-pol´skaia] propaganda." Nevertheless, he found it inappropriate to translate the Gospels into a "plebeian language that has no grammar and no literature"; and he urged that so long as "Polish intrigues" de stabilized the tsarist order, the "Little Russian party … should be subjected to vigilant supervision." 41 A June 1863 memorandum forwarded to St. Petersburg by the Kiev Censorship Committee echoed the notion that the proliferation of Little Russian literature among the masses might alienate peasants from a shared imperial culture and noted that Polish revanchists had openly discussed opportunities to use the Ukrainian language to turn the local population against the imperial state. 42 Minister of the Interior Valuev now perceived a real risk that Little Russian patriotism, rather than reinforcing the de-Polonization campaign, would serve the interests of Polish revanchists. In July, he directed censors to prevent the publication of Ukrainian-language religious texts and primers until the 38 ministries could more fully review the full implications of Ukrainophile activities. Insisting that the Little Russian "dialect" was merely a version of Russian "corrupted by Polish influence," Valuev paraphrased Katkov in what would become the circular's most infamous line-"there was not, is not, and cannot be any distinct [osobyi] Little Russian language." 43 Despite protests from Kiev Ukrainophiles and the minister of education-and a warning from the Third Section itself that repressive measures directed at Ukrainophiles might entice them to respond to the overtures that recently had been made by Polish agitators-the circular remained in effect until Valuev left office in 1868, severely restricting Ukrainian publishing ventures. 44 However, Valuev's measures, which aimed to mitigate the specific risk that Polish patriots would use Ukrainophile ideas for their own benefit, did not interfere with activists' ongoing efforts to write a history of Little Russia and to promote and protect folk culture, which officials continued to view as activities that reinforced rather than threatened imperial unity. 45 Indeed, as the de-Polonization campaign again intensified following the 1863 revolt, Kiev's Ukrainophile activists secured a more prominent role in local intellectual life and maintained official support for many of their ventures. 46 Khlopomany and hromadtsy flocked to the Commission for the Analysis of Historical Documents, whose new president, Iuzefovich, now touted the group's ability to "expose the true history of the Western region, establish its true relationship to Poland and Russia, [and] dispel false notions intentionally spread by Polish historians and publicists." 47 Antonovich, who became editor of the group's official publication in 1863, used the forum to celebrate the role of the Little Russian masses in the centuries-long "bloody battle" to cast off the alleged "yoke" of Polish and Jewish domination. 48 The
Kiev governor-general's office applauded the group's activities, quadrupling its annual subsidy (now funded by the special taxes levied on the szlachta).
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In the 1860s-70s, Antonovich and a young colleague from the Hromada, M. P. Dragomanov, conducted (and published legally) a massive study of Ukrainian-language folksongs, which highlighted the suffering of the Little Russian people under Polish rule-and lavished praise on the imperial authorities working to de-Polonize their native land.
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If the Valuev decree frustrated Ukrainophiles' attempts to reach out to the masses, they soon found new means of introducing their ideas to a broader public. In 1864, V. Ia. Shul´gin, a professional historian and a member of the commission, used funds that he had gathered from his colleagues in the group to establish Kiev's first daily newspaper, Kievlianin.
51 The paper (whose title alluded to Maksimovich's earlier venture), aimed to acquaint readers across the empire with the unique history and special needs of the southwestern borderlands, raising awareness of the cultural traditions of the Little Russian people-and their continued suffering under the "triple yoke of Catholic clergy, Poles (landlords, rentiers, and estate managers) and Jews." 52 Reflecting the "radical democratism" that prevailed among Kiev's Ukrainophile intelligentsia, the paper published historical retrospectives of the role that Hromada members had played in combating Polish influence and lauded Dragomanov's ethnographic research (indeed, the young scholaractivist was a founding member of the paper's editorial board).
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Perhaps the most impressive attempt of Kiev's Ukrainophile activists to project their power and to cultivate a public sympathetic to their agenda can be seen in their campaign to erect a monument to Bogdan Khmel´nitskii in 49 Sbornik statei i materialov po istorii iugo-zapadnoi Rossii, 14-15. 50 the city. In the aftermath of the 1863 revolt, Iuzefovich convened a working group under the Commission for the Analysis of Historical Documents to collect money and rally support for the project, which had first been proposed by Maksimovich in the 1850s. 54 By the late 1860s, the group had enlisted the St. Petersburg-based sculptor M. O. Mikeshin in the project. Famed for his intricate creations and his pride in the empire-he had completed the monument to the millennium of Russia in Novgorod in 1859 and would finish his homage to Catherine the Great in St. Petersburg in 1873-Mikeshin shared the radically populist views of many commission members. The son of a poor Belorusian family whose arts studies had been funded by a local noble awed by his talent, the sculptor was a close friend and long-time collaborator of Taras Shevchenko, who lauded his "democratic worldview." 55 During an 1869 visit to Mikeshin's studio, Alexander II noticed a model of a Cossack on horseback and inquired about it. Mikeshin explained to the tsar that "in Ukraine [na Ukraine] under the influence of the Polish uprising, a broad-based desire to celebrate the patriotic service of Hetman Khmel´nitskii, who joined Ukraine to Russia, had arisen." 56 Alexander expressed his approval for the project, and several months later, Mikeshin completed a model of the hetman on horseback. 57 In the sculptor's words, under the steed's hooves lay broken chains and the "body of a Jesuit or a priest, almost completely covered by a broken Polish flag that is full of holes… . Lower, on a ledge, there is a fallen but still living Polish noble, and still lower … a Yid in the last throes of death caught red-handed [u kotorogo ruki zastyli ], holding religious vessels and items and money." 58 These figures, Mikeshin later explained, "depict the three enemies against whom Khmel´nitskii fought so gloriously in Ukraine, assisting in the political death of Poland."
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The model melded expressions of Little Russian patriotism with reminders of the ways that Ukrainophilism reinforced imperial unity. The pedestal supporting the hetman portrayed a kobzar [Ukrainian itinerant poet] who bore a striking resemblance to Taras Shevchenko and conveyed the "democratic" spirit of the monument; gathered around him were figures of Great, White, Little, and Galician Russian ethnographic types. 60 An inscription on the front of the monument read, "A united, indivisible Russia-to Hetman Bogdan Khmel´nitskii"; scenes of the hetman's military victories over Polish forces and the names of "heroes of Little Russian Cossackdom" were emblazoned on the four corners of the pedestal. 61 Below the horse's hooves, Mikeshin added a traditional Ukrainian folksong of the 17th century recently published by Dragomanov: "Oh, it will be better / oh, it will be more beautiful / When in our Ukraine / There are no Jews, no Poles / And no Union." 62 In 1870, Governor-General A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov received formal permission to convene a committee to see the monument to fruition. Chaired by Iuzefovich, the group featured a familiar cast of characters, including Antonovich, Maksimovich, and Rigel´man.
63 Consistent with the pattern we have seen earlier, Iuzefovich insisted that the planning must be a "truly popular matter." While Kievlianin admiringly reviewed popular histories of Khmel´nitskii's campaigns-quoting Mikeshin's "folksong" in one article 64 -committee members worked to "compile a short but very clear note about Khmel´nitskii's meaning for Russian history" and circulated appeals for funding that welcomed "donations of a few cents from simple people."
The official sanctioning of the Khmel´nitskii project marked the apex of the Little Russian lobby's power, and activists quickly moved to capitalize on their influence. In 1872, Shul´gin, Iuzefovich, and Hromada leaders convinced the authorities to authorize the establishment of a chapter of the Imperial Geographic Society in Kiev. The society's founders hoped that "Ukrainian self-organization" and organized research projects on Cossack history, Ukrainian literature, and regional demographics could "counteract the Polish [culture] that was still powerful in the region." 66 The establishment of the Kiev Geographic Society also began a renaissance in Ukrainian-language publishing ventures, which rebounded to their pre-1863 limits by 1874. 67 On the occasion of the group's opening, Chubinskii, who had returned to Kiev after his exile, celebrated its potential simultaneously to promote local culture, discredit Polish claims on the western borderlands, and strengthen the empire.
68 Dondukov-Korsakov lauded the patriotic service of society members, as officials in his office discussed how best to reward Antonovich, who had played a critical role in organizing the group.
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The 1863 revolt raised concern among officials that Polish agitators might turn Little Russian ethno-national consciousness against the empire, but it did not end their efforts to employ Ukrainophile ideas as a weapon in the dePolonization campaign. If Little Russian activists found their opportunities to publish in Ukrainian limited in the immediate aftermath of the insurrectionand the need to demonstrate that their activities reinforced imperial unity more pressing-they in fact reached the height of their influence after the Valuev decree. Local officials endorsed and financially supported numerous Ukrainophile efforts to reach out to an expanding urban public, and the tsar himself approved the Khmel´nitskii statue, which heralded the imminent arrival of a future in which Little Russians-regardless of their class statuscould reclaim their native land from their putative national enemies.
The Demise of the Kiev Experiment
Recognizing that the battle against Polish-Catholic civilization could not be won without the ethno-national mobilization of Kiev's Orthodox population, officials had relied on Ukrainophiles to help them claim the southwestern borderlands for the empire. By the 1870s, however, as the imminent political threat posed by the region's Poles began to wane, bureaucrats became more attuned to the ways that the activities of Kiev activists had undermined the 66 The 1872 request to incorporate the society is reprinted in Savchenko, Zaborona ukrainstva, 233-34. See also P. P. Chubinskii, ed., Trudy etnografichesko-statisticheskoi ekspeditsii v Zapadnorusskii krai (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskoe russkoe geograficheskoe obshchestvo, 1872); and Ihnat Zhytets´kyi, "Pivdenno-Zakhidnyi viddil geografichnoho tovarystva u Kyivi," Ukraina, no. 5 (1927): 33. 67 Thirty-two Ukrainian books were approved by censors in 1874, just one short of the number published in 1863 (Remy, "Valuev Circular," 97). Remy improbably attributes this rebound in Ukrainian publishing to corruption within the Kiev censorship apparatus, failing to note that it is fully consistent with the influence that Ukrainophiles enjoyed in local politics in the late 1860s and early 1870s. 68 Cited in Savchenko, Zaborona ukrainstva, 31. 69 Miller, Ukrainian Question, 161. tsarist order. Censors expressed concern that Kievlianin regularly denounced state policies (the paper often lamented that official efforts to protect the interests of the borderlands' simple folk had proven inadequate). 70 They also complained that local activists' publications aimed at the simple folk employed "excessively harsh" rhetoric when discussing the influence of the city's non-Orthodox population, leading uneducated readers to potentially "dangerous" conclusions. 71 Meanwhile, elite government figures began to reconsider their support for the Khmel´nitskii monument. By the early 1870s, Alexander II's brother, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, openly denounced the statue as divisive; the tsar himself qualified his initial enthusiasm for the project, ordering that the ritual objects be removed from the hands of the Jew and the trampled Polish standard from under the feet of the Jesuit. 72 A public exhibition of a model of the statue in Kiev in 1872 provoked further controversy. Charging that the depiction of the hetman's violent defeat of the priest, Polish noble, and Jew promoted the "incitement of national hatred" and the "kindling of antisocial passions" [razzhiganie antisotsial´nykh strastei], the city's Catholic community railed against the project. 73 Concurring that the statue would stand as a "shameful pillory" to the "Catholic-Polish and Jewish" residents who encountered it, N. A. Rigel´man resigned from the committee overseeing the statue's completion. 74 In spite of this opposition, however, leading Ukrainophile activists resolutely defended the project. Denouncing the statue's critics, Kievlianin insisted that "neither the Polish landlord nor the priest nor the Jew has yet been cast off the precipice; this region is still put to the test by their tenacity."
Eager to avoid further delays in the project's realization, Governor-General Dondukov-Korsakov and Iuzefovich attempted to craft a compromise. 76 In December 1872, Iuzefovich suggested that all figures except for the horseman, a pair of broken chains lying under the horse's hooves-a "symbol of the trampling of Polish oppression"-and the broken Polish banner (which Alexander II had already directed Mikeshin to omit) be removed from the model. 77 Mikeshin balked, refusing "under any circumstances" to change the project unless a "higher political authority" demanded it. 78 In February 1873, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich visited Mikeshin's studio and berated the artist, informing him that the project could continue only if the figures of Khmel´nitskii's adversaries were omitted and the overall "meaning" of the monument altered. 79 Following the encounter between Mikeshin and the grand duke, the committee received permission to conclude a contract with the sculptor to build a large model of the horseman alone; to ensure that he maintained adequate control over the project, Konstantin Nikolaevich secured metal for the statue from the budget of the Naval Ministry, which he controlled. 80 In 1878, Alexander II again was invited to Mikeshin's studio to review the final version of the model. Presumably in an attempt to appease the tsar, the sculptor had diluted the Little Russian patriotism expressed in the initial model, replacing the folksong that had once graced the pedestal with the inscription, "Let us follow the Orthodox Tsar of the East." 81 Alexander was horrified, however, to discover that the body of a Jesuit covered by a Polish banner had reappeared in this new iteration and demanded that all figures besides the horseman be "completely removed." 82 The order provoked an angry response from Mikeshin, but it also confused the committee, which claimed that it was not clear whether Alexander wanted both the Jesuit and the flag removed, or merely the human figure omitted. 83 Desperate to salvage the original intent of the monument, the committee quickly ruled that the tsar's demand should be interpreted narrowly: the Jesuit could be eliminated, but the broken standard must be retained as a "symbol of Khmel´nitskii's trampling of Polish dominion."
84 As Iuzefovich explained the committee's reasoning to the governor-general: "the sense of His Majesty's command relates to a religious sentiment-the fact that it is not pleasant to be trampled under the feet of the horse, even for a Jesuit-and not the political sentiment expressed in the form of a broken standard-the historical fact of the liberation of the Russian regions from foreign slavery, which serves as the very basis of the idea of the monument." 85 In March 1880, however, the committee's ruling was overturned: the Ministry of the Interior confirmed that the tsar had indeed meant that all flourishes, including the Polish standard, must be removed, and that the monument should "consist only of a single figure of Bogdan Khmel´nitskii on horseback." 86 In 1888, the figure of a lone horseman was erected in front of St. Sophia's Cathedral in central Kiev, where it still stands today.
Increasing scrutiny of the Kiev experiment by elite figures within the government sowed rancor within the ranks of Little Russian activists. In the early 1870s, M. P. Dragomanov began to challenge the leadership of the Little Russian lobby in high society circles as well as in print. The young publicist denounced Kiev intellectuals-including his mentor, Shul´gin-for the passivity he saw in their attempts to conform to the letter of the Valuev decree while failing adequately to contest the serious charges that Ukrainophile activities were products of a "Polish intrigue." 87 Many of the younger members of the Kiev chapter of the Imperial Geographic Society sided with Dragomanov, who along with Chubinskii began to play a more prominent role in the group. In 1873 elections, Geographic Society members elected Chubinskii to the ranks of the group's leaders and relegated Iuzefovich and Shul´gin to largely symbolic positions, excluding them from the planning of the regional census and archeological congress that the society undertook (with the extensive cooperation of the local authorities) in 1874. 88 Eager to seek revenge against the colleagues who had slighted them, Shul´gin and Iuzefovich initiated a propaganda campaign against the Geographic Society. In an 1874 editorial in Kievlianin, Shul´gin claimed that leaders of the society had rejected prospective members who could not speak Ukrainian, chiding them for subordinating the cause of imperial unity to narrower Little Russian interests-a tactic reminiscent of Katkov's assault on the Ukrainophiles in 1863. 89 Several months later, in the presence of Dondukov-Korsakov, Iuzefovich charged that Chubinskii, Dragomanov, and their closest associates were Ukrainian separatists. 90 Supporters of Chubinskii and Dragomanov, who had assumed editorial control of the daily Kievskii telegraf, used the paper to refute charges that their activities were in any way subversive, pointing out that "Little Russian patriots" had long been conducting their activities on a legal basis with the full knowledge and support of the authorities. 91 The governor-general's office, for its part, chose not to get involved in what it regarded as a private dispute; local censors even refused to print Iuzefovich's 1875 letter of resignation from the Geographic Society, noting that it accused of sedition individuals whose political reliability had never been questioned. 92 Barred from airing his complaints in the local press, Iuzefovich composed a manifesto describing the subversive program of the "so-called Ukrainian movement" and distributed it in elite bureaucratic circles. Iuzefovich began his tract by noting the many junctures at which Little Russian patriotism had reinforced the power of the imperial state and the Orthodox Church. 93 He continued to explain that beginning in the 1860s, however, the Osnova circle-to which, he failed to mention, he himself had belonged-had attempted to use growing awareness of Little Russian culture to undermine local support for the government rather than rally it. 94 Iuzefovich lamented that these subversive tendencies had only grown more prominent in recent years, as Chubinskii and Dragomanov had assumed influence in the Geographic Society and Kievskii telegraf. Charging that Kiev Ukrainophiles had promoted separatist and revolutionary ideas among both peasants and the educated classes and that their efforts to promote the Ukrainian language undermined the "wholeness of the state," Iuzefovich insisted that officials intervene quickly and decisively. 95 Alarmed by Iuzefovich's allegations, the Ministry of the Interior launched a special commission to investigate "Ukrainophile propaganda" emanating from Kiev and invited Iuzefovich to join. 96 Throughout the investigation, officials showed remarkable deference to Iuzefovich, soliciting his feedback on the memoranda prepared by the ministries participating in the commission. 97 The infamous decree ordered Kievskii telegraf and the Kiev branch of the Geographic Society closed and prohibited publications (with the exception of historical documents) in the "Little Russian dialect." 99 Concurrent investigations of Dragomanov and Chubinskii concluded that the two exhibited a "Ukrainophilic orientation that does not correspond to the views of the government." The former was relieved from his position at St. Vladimir's and fled the Russian Empire, while the latter was exiled from the Little Russian provinces in the wake of the Ems Decree. 100 Intended to counteract the threat that Ukrainophile ideologies would evolve into national separatism, the Ems Decree only fractured and polarized former Little Russian activists, driving them into hostile and well-defined groups of Ukrainian and Russian nationalists. The victims of the measure turned the cultural consciousness and popular mobilization techniques that they had refined under official tutelage against the imperial state. Dragomanov, who remained in exile for the rest of his life, now added "the bureaucratic overlords [pany]…, the Moscow overlords" to the ranks of the foreign oppressors of the Ukrainian simple folk. 101 Meanwhile, the allies of Iuzefovich and Shul´gin-many themselves veterans of Osnova and the Hromadapresented their former colleagues as a subversive "Ukrainian party" that promoted "enmity toward central Russia." 102 These self-proclaimed "Russian nationalists" found refuge in Kievlianin, which perceived Ukrainophile turncoats supported by Polish and Jewish conspirators lurking behind every corner. 103 By the early 20th century, the Russian and Ukrainian nationalists struggling for control of Kiev had produced works that expunged the Kiev experiment from the historical record. Histories written by elderly veterans of the Commission for the Analysis of Historical Documents portrayed the khlopomany as Polish and Jewish agents who had attempted to destroy the Russian Empire; 104 Iuzefovich's son, Boris, and Shul´gin's son, Vasilii, who emerged as theoreticians of Russian nationalism in the 1905 period, obscured the role that their fathers had played in promoting Ukrainian culture and language. 105 Meanwhile, Ukrainian nationalists masked the key role that local bureaucrats had played in advancing Little Russian consciousness. The historian Mykhailo Hrushevs´kyi, Antonovich's protégé and himself a former member of the Commission for the Analysis of Historical Documents, presented the 19th century as a long struggle between Ukrainian national awakeners and an oppressive, Russifying bureaucracy; indeed, following his mentor's death, Hrushevs´kyi penned a biographical sketch that chronicled Antonovich's life-long struggle against imperial rule.
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Conclusion
The unprecedented threat posed by the Polish insurrections of the 19th century compelled Russian officials to search for new ways to unify the imperial body politic. Seeing as much positive potential as dangerous influence in ethnonational ideas, bureaucrats permitted Ukrainophile activists to use official institutions to consolidate a national history, promote Little Russian culture, and even to forge new relationships between elites and the masses-all of which they hoped would challenge Polish power and reinforce Orthodox claims on Kiev. If officials vigilantly policed expressions of Ukrainophile activities that they feared would give aid to national enemies or encourage separatism, they overtly encouraged others that they believed would promote imperial unity. The Kiev experiment thus represented an ambitious effort to reconcile imperial patriotism and national ideas, and to draw on the mobilizational power of ethno-national consciousness without unleashing the obvious threats that it posed to the imperial system. Ultimately, however, the Kiev experiment destabilized imperial authority rather than revitalizing it. As various segments of officialdom had come to understand by the 1870s, Kiev Ukrainophiles' efforts to help the Little Russian people reclaim their native land from their foreign "exploiters"-through violence, if necessary-seriously undermined the ideological foundations of autocracy and intensified conflicts among the southwestern borderlands' diverse population. Even as activists used their role in the de-Polonization campaign to enhance their social standing and political influence, figures such as Shul´gin and Iuzefovich manipulated official fears of national separatism to satisfy private agendas. The Ems Decree-the state's most comprehensive attempt yet to manage the potential threat posed by Ukrainophile ideasonly radicalized and polarized the Kiev intelligentsia, producing rival camps which used the ideas and techniques they had refined under state tutelage to pursue mutually opposed Ukrainian and Russian national projects. The Russian Empire could not survive the threat posed by Polish revanchism without drawing on the power of Little Russian patriotism. But it also could not withstand the nationalizing forces unleashed by the state itself, which officials poorly understood and ineffectively managed. 
